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Extended Abstract 
The proposed paper presents an argument in favor of a Rawlsian approach to ethics for 
Internet technology companies (den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008; Hoffman, 2017). Ethics 
statements from such companies are analyzed and shown to be utilitarian and teleological in 
nature, and therefore in opposition to Rawls’ theories of justice and fairness. The statements 
are also shown to have traits in common with Confucian virtue ethics (Ames, 2011; Nylan, 
2008). 
In contrast to popular perception, American moral philosopher John Rawls did not always 
denounce consequentialism. He wrote that not taking “consequences into account in judging 
rightness” would be “irrational, crazy” (Rawls, 1971, p. 30). Rawls’ critique of utilitarianism, 
rather, concerned the extent to which utilitarianism relies on consequentialism and also that 
it is teleological (Rawls, 1971). 
Hence, viewing the technology ethics and guidelines presented by Internet corporations 
through a Rawlsian lens raises the question: What is more teleological than companies such 
as Google, Facebook, and their associated platforms, whose business models entail 
collecting personal user data and making predictions based on these data? Their stated 
telos is to use the collected data to improve user experiences on services offered to the 
public for free, and to make contributions to a range of public goods from health care to 
national security through predictive data analytics. Of course, the data sets are also used to 
predict the effects of commercial and political advertising, which optimizes the companies’ 
shareholder profits (Zuboff, 2015, 2019). 
That the justification for the data collection is presented as the benefits outweighing the 
harms for the biggest number of people demonstrates the teleological and utilitarian 
approach taken by these technology companies. The companies’ ethics statements are often 
superficial guidelines with very little adherence to actual ethical practice or theory (Microsoft, 
2019; Pichai, 2018). By using what the corporations appear to believe are ethical 
“buzzwords”, these ethics statements often resemble Confucian virtue ethics, in that they 
present virtues to be adopted without rooting these virtues in empirical knowledge, ethical 
theory or presenting a solidly reasoned argument for them (separating them substantially 
from the virtue-based technology ethics presented by Ess (2011) and Vallor (2016)). Similar 
to Confucius presenting the ethical necessity of virtues such as order and propriety as 
somewhat self-evident, the virtues proposed in tech company ethics statements are 
contextless and theoretically unmoored (Wong, 2012). The ethics practices of technology 
companies share a characteristic with Confucian virtue ethics in that the companies enforce 
strictly hierarchical decisionmaking (Healey & Woods, 2017). The above-mentioned 
statements and practices are all contingent on the perceived ability of the technology 
companies to accurately predict the consequences of their actions and the effect of their 
products. This confidence in predictions coupled with quasi-Confucianist virtue ethics is yet 
another demonstration of teleological utilitarianism. 
Employing an applied ethics method, public ethics statements from Google, Microsoft, and 
Facebook are analyzed using the work of two opponents of teleological utilitarianism and 
Confucianism, John Rawls and Lao-Tzu. More than two thousand years apart, Rawls and Lao-
Tzu both made compelling and strong arguments against employing conjectures about the 
consequences of decisions and actions as the foundation for decision-making (Lin et al., 
2013; Vuong et al., 2018). Lao-Tzu, likely a pseudonym, did so in the classic Taoist text Tao 
Te Ching, which also contains simple rebuttals of several Confucian virtues. Several 
arguments emerge from the perspectives of these two philosophers that call the prediction-
heavy, teleological and consequentialism-based ethics approach of technology companies 
into question, including the demonstrable difficulty associated with achieving high accuracy 
in forecasts of technological development, adoption, and practices such as online data 
collection (Meade & Islam, 2006). 
After showing how the tech industry’s utilitarian-Confucian hegemony clashes with Rawlsian 
ethics and Taoism, these schools of thought are demonstrated as viable alternatives in the 
construction of technology ethics. The paper argues that these philosophies are particularly 
viable when considering the ethics of Internet-related technologies, as the communicative, 
interactive, and participatory nature of the online realm is, arguably, dominated by rapid 
change. 
The speed with which the torrents of changes and transformations flow and thereby 
constitute the Internet’s many domains is not the only thing that makes prediction difficult. 
As Popper (1945) famously pointed out, a constant increase of human knowledge logically 
leads to a decreased predictability and a heightened risk of unintended consequences being 
the outcome. In combination, the speed of change, the production of new information, and 
the proliferation of the latter, makes the Internet a phenomenon characterized much more by 
unpredictability than, for example, some examples of hardware development. The paper 
concludes by arguing how these factors demonstrate that Rawlsian, deontological ethics can 
be a viable alternative to utilitarianism in technology ethics, perhaps even in combination 
with elements of Taoist thought. 
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